Heated Rivalry, Canadarm and an AI moose: How could Canada’s soft power contribute to its statecraft?
As Canada defines its foreign policy and rebuilds its hard power, Tom Codrington, CSS Senior Fellow, argues that its global reputation deserves strategic investment too. From cultural exports to scientific leadership, the article explores how Canada can turn its soft power into concrete gains for its security, prosperity and international influence.
By definition, middle powers cannot always get their way through hard power alone. So how can Canada aspire to achieve Prime Minister Carney’s ambitious goals in a more competitive, ruptured world order, where the familiar patterns of multilateralism and US hegemony can no longer be relied upon to do the heavy lifting? Rebuilding Canadian hard power is an important part of the answer. So is collaboration with others and setting a small number of realistic goals. But soft power is also a key part of the answer, and if used well, it can act as a force multiplier for other forms of Canadian power. As the government prepares to launch Canada’s first foreign policy strategy in twenty years, it is worth considering how a more strategic deployment of Canada’s latent soft power could better support its security and prosperity.
When PM Carney stood up in Davos in January 2026, the world listened. Others have said similar things before – many times, in fact. But coming from a Canadian made it more impactful. This is soft power in action. Over many years, Canada has built a global brand that predisposes many to trust Canada and Canadians, and to believe them to be honest, kind and true to their principles – if, perhaps, a little naïve or parochial, and somewhat inseparable from the US.
When the late Joseph Nye coined the term “soft power” in 1990, he was referring to the United States’ ability to co-opt through force of attraction or persuasion, rather than simply coerce through military or economic pressure. His definition encompassed a country’s cultural exports, its political values and its policies. Nye’s soft power does not exist on a separate plane from other tools of statecraft: it is reinforced by (and can reinforce) hard power, and it sits at one end of a continuum of tools used by states to further their interests abroad.
In the modern context, where foreign policy outcomes pursued by states are ever broader, a country’s soft power tools can extend beyond its culture, political values and policies. They might also include how its scientific and technological contributions are perceived; how its companies behave abroad and how it invests overseas; how foreign tourists, students, immigrants and business travellers experience it; the impression that its citizens leave when travelling themselves; and how its media and social media output garners attention abroad. For Canada, all of these tools matter, because they shape how others see the country, and how willing they are to work with Canadians, long before a politician, business
leader or diplomat steps up to a podium or sits down at a negotiating table.
There is a danger that Canada undervalues its soft power. I have always found it difficult to explain to Canadians just how well they are perceived by many overseas, particularly in Europe. The reception that Canadians enjoy abroad is simply far more positive than that afforded to almost everyone else. Recent Canada-EU messaging is case in point: a truly unprecedented narrative leap from the EU. The challenge – for both Canada-EU negotiations as well as for the broader use of soft power – is how to turn good feelings and strong convening power into concrete results. Trudeau-era foreign policy was not universally successful here as it was seen by some, both domestically and internationally, as overly reliant on virtue signalling and complacent about the strength and appeal of Canadian values. Nevertheless, the Canadian brand that Carney’s administration inherited is a very strong one, even if perhaps not quite the right fit for today’s challenges, and certainly in need of some hard power backup. When the foundations are solid, it is better to renovate an old house and reinvest in it than to knock it down and start again. While soft power is not effective in isolation, nor an end in itself, it is much harder to achieve concrete results without good feelings or convening power.
So how can Canada make better use of its soft power as an instrument of statecraft? Though only a few of the levers of soft power are controlled by governments, there are still important roles that government can play to convene, collaborate and amplify. These vary in terms of cost, from almost free to significant, long-term investments. Efficient deployment of soft power should not mean starting from scratch or attempting to replicate or compete with the creative sector. Instead, governments can analyze which elements of their soft power armoury might resonate with a particular target audience; they can put in place domestic frameworks and incentives to encourage their soft power producers to develop or behave in certain ways; and they can deploy their international diplomatic and commercial networks to help their soft power make an impact in a target market. They can also manage risks to their soft power, for example how their companies behave in foreign jurisdictions that struggle with corruption.
Because a country’s soft power boils down to how it is perceived by others, alignment with professed values matters. Russia may not care if its version of soft power projection is seen as propaganda or if its companies are seen as corrupt, because freedom of the press and the rule of law are not part of its brand. But Canada should, because nothing undermines soft power more effectively than the appearance of hypocrisy. Canadian government action should therefore strive to stay on the right side of the line between supporting its independent soft power producers and directing or instrumentalizing them. It is a difficult line to draw. There is plenty of grey area, and every action in this space can have unexpected second-order effects. But it is perfectly possible to do, particularly if Canada draws on examples from other countries and takes advice from its own soft power producers. Canada also shouldn’t shy away from particular tools just because others with different values use them – provided they can be used in a way that feels authentic to Canadian values.
To help turn latent soft power assets into active tools of statecraft, Canada needs targeted engagement and scalable investments in key sectors.
Music, arts, and film
Music, arts, and film are often deployed by governments in support of foreign policy, sometimes requiring significant long-term investment.
In 1997, faced with the Asian Financial Crisis, the South Korean Government began to turn to its cultural industries. A key factor in what later became the global K-Pop movement was the Ministry of Culture, Sports and Tourism’s systematic support for content production, international promotion and overseas expansion.
Since 1956, the US State Department has funded top musicians to tour the world – initially focusing on countries flirting with communism or the Soviet Union – to promote American values. Known initially as “Jazz Ambassadors”, the program has evolved many times and continues in the form of American Music Abroad.
On a smaller scale, after Ukraine was illegally invaded (again) by Russia in 2022, one of its responses was to encourage the National Ballet of Ukraine to tour internationally and spread Ukraine’s brand and message in a way that resonated more deeply than news images or political speeches.
For countries like Canada that already have globally marketable assets, promoting Canadian music, arts and film is low-hanging fruit. In many ways, Canada has already followed the South Korean model, but without the deliberate focus on internationalization. Canada has a long tradition of mobilizing its domestic market in support of its cultural sector – for example, through requiring minimum Canadian content from domestic music broadcasters or through its highly sophisticated subsidy, public equity and tax credit system for film and TV production. The focus to date has been on sustaining space for national storytelling and cultural identity which might otherwise be overwhelmed by the US creative sector. Many Canadian musicians, artists and cultural products have then gone on to enjoy strong international appeal, from Cirque du Soleil to Heated Rivalry, but export potential has usually been a secondary consideration within the system.
The logical next step is to consider whether Canada’s existing policies, regulations and sectoral supports can be tweaked to systematically optimize for exports, ideally with particular bias towards markets that are foreign policy priorities. By involving the Ministry of Canadian Heritage in the forthcoming foreign policy strategy, the federal Government may be able to find mechanisms – whether small changes to granting programs, regulatory adjustments, or market access – that can help Canadian artists to reach the right international audiences.
Even without coordination across ministries, embassies can deploy small public diplomacy programs to support promising Canadian artists to perform abroad, reach new audiences and build credibility, while also strengthening the embassy’s local connections and reputation. Some light-touch central coordination in Ottawa, on a similar basis to American Music Abroad, could make an outsized difference.
Canadians are already paying to support a strong national creative sector; a small additional investment could amplify its soft power impact, raising Canada’s profile and making others more willing to listen to and understand Canadian perspectives. In specific cases, potent storytelling can also change the international agenda, providing a platform for Canadian stories to build momentum behind issues of Canadian significance, such as Arctic sovereignty or economic resilience.
News, journalism and social media
There are few soft power outcomes more desirable than having your international counterparts take in their news and information through the lens of your country’s media.
When Russia decided in 2005 that it wanted to reshape its image in Europe, it launched – and funded – Russia Today (RT). Broadcasting in English, Spanish, and Arabic, it has evolved with the Kremlin’s messaging and remains a key instrument in Russia’s propaganda machine. Many other states have directly supported their broadcasters to reach foreign audiences, from BBC World to the Voice of America to China Global Television Network.
In Canada’s case, its reputation as an honest broker in the increasingly distrusted global information space, and the decline of funding for both the US and UK international broadcasters, might offer an opportunity to promote its own international journalism. During the Cold War, CBC’s Radio Canada International was one of the most-listened-to shortwave news sources in the world. But cutbacks over decades have left it far from a potent force in international media. Could this unique time of Canadian reinvention be the moment to reinvigorate the “Voice of Canada”? To do so would require sustained bipartisan support and significant long-term funding.
In the 21st century, of course, there are also more cost-effective options to help Canadian journalists reach greater international audiences. Those could include incentivizing key publications to remove paywalls for readers in particular countries, or returning to the Online News Act negotiating table with digital platform giants – this time with the broader goal of making Canadian journalism more globally accessible.
Traditional journalism, though critical to the functioning of liberal democracies, continues to lose ground to social media and independent content creators. Some of those creators are themselves projecting Canadian soft power, whether intentionally or not – for example @demonflyingfox’s AI video featuring Canadian wildlife fighting a trade war, which garnered millions of views.
Governments, unfortunately, are not natural content creators, and their efforts to interact directly with social media are often underwhelming. Regulation offers some scope for middle powers to shape how social media is consumed within, and sometimes beyond, their borders, but the work required is considerable. Instead, the most interesting role that governments – including Canada’s – can play may be in elevating, aiding and/or abetting selected independent content creators in support of their soft power goals. This need not be as sinister as Iranian or Russian-backed information campaigns, or as hollow and mercantile as the UAE’s Creators HQ. A values-aligned Canadian way to nurture social media content creation could become not only an amplifier of Canadian soft power but also an important contribution to the global liberal democracy toolkit.
Successfully increasing Canada’s share of global news and information consumption could enable more people around the world to understand global issues through a Canadian lens, making it easier for Canadian leaders to persuade their counterparts to align on strategic priorities, such as supporting Ukraine or promoting free and fair market access.
Cultural champions
Soft power is created, on the whole, by people outside government. But that doesn’t mean those people can’t play an active role in helping to pursue the goals of statecraft – whether amplifying messages, prioritizing their international partnerships or intentionally growing the reputation and credibility of their home country.
The French government has long pursued a systematic approach to cultural diplomacy. Through its networks of cultural attachés, Instituts Français and Alliances Françaises overseas, as well as its many domestic councils, advisory boards and funding agencies, it ensures that French cultural champions are informed about the country’s goals and values overseas and involved in shaping France’s international strategy. On a smaller scale, when the UK government decided to pursue a more “hard-nosed approach” to soft power, it formed the UK Soft Power Council in 2025, convening leaders from the UK’s most recognized soft power sectors quarterly to advise – and be briefed by – government ministers.
It makes great sense to bring your country’s most recognizable figures into the government tent to participate in statecraft – to the extent that they are willing and comfortable to do so. Not all Canadian greats might want to be too closely involved with government, and not all might agree with the goals of the government of the day. That’s a healthy thing for a liberal democracy. But, given the opportunity and the current climate, I expect a sizeable majority of Canadian cultural champions would want to support Canadian foreign policy goals.
Methods for connecting with cultural champions are varied and usually very cheap. They include quarterly advisory councils with senior ministers; quiet briefings from embassies ahead of international tours or events; awards galas or recognition days hosted by the government; federal booths at key conferences and events such as TIFF. The challenge is coordinating and sustaining the government side of the relationship, and ensuring it stays sufficiently meaningful to continue to be worth the time of (often) high-net-worth individuals.
With well-managed government support, cultural champions could help Canada to build and sustain momentum behind priority foreign policy campaigns; educate different audiences about Canadian perspectives and predispose those audiences to collaborate; or lend their time and talents directly to supporting diplomatic endeavours. For example, when Canada joins Eurovision, what should its first competitors say in their piece to camera, and why?
Science, technology and higher education
The next phase of geopolitical competition will be decided, at least in part, by advances in science and technology. Whether in AI, quantum or other fields, an ever-growing proportion of government time is being spent on negotiating technological standards, vying for scientific know-how, wooing tech companies and burnishing domestic technological credentials. Canada, too, has a story to tell here and much to gain.
There is a broad range of tools available to promote a country’s scientific and technological prowess, from multi-decade scholarship programs to short-term advertising campaigns. Which tool is most effective depends on the objective and the target audience. The countries that obtain the best results are clear-eyed about this. Singapore markets itself to tech companies and entrepreneurs worldwide looking for an Asia hub. Japan uses public funding to leverage its scientific research to build closer ties with its ASEAN neighbours, and to partner with developing countries. Estonia has advanced e-government to the point where it can now offer its learnings in digital governance to selected countries as its own form of soft power.
This is a mixed area for Canada. Though Canadian science, technology and innovation are impressive and enjoy a strong global reputation, recent reductions in international student visa quotas have damaged Canada’s international image as a welcoming destination for students and early-career researchers – particularly in markets such as India and China. Nevertheless, given that strategic autonomy in technology is one of the core aims of Prime Minister Carney’s rebuilding of Canada’s economy and agency, there can and should be soft power mileage to be made in the sector.
Here is where the upcoming foreign policy strategy would benefit from being as precise as possible. Should Canada’s science and technology be used as a general public diplomacy instrument, like Canadarm was? Or should Canadian efforts be targeted at influencing global regulators to collaborate to build a third way of developing frontier technologies such as AI and quantum, in keeping with liberal democratic values? Or should they target foreign tech companies to encourage investment and Canadian-based R&D? These will all be highly prized objectives, but clarity of purpose and proportionate resourcing for each associated soft power campaign will be paramount, as it would be easy to miss the mark.
Putting Canada’s Soft Power to Work
These policy measures illustrate some of the many ways Canada can put one of its greatest international assets—its reputation—to work. As the government defines its foreign policy and rebuilds its hard power, it can’t lose sight of the relationships and credibility that help turn capability into influence. As a middle power, Canada needs to invest in and deploy both soft and hard power effectively. Alone, neither is enough.
